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FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY WITHOUT METAPHYSICS
Olof Kinberg
The author was formerly Superintendent of Longbro Mental Hospital; Lecturer
on Forensic Psychiatry in the Faculty of Medicine at Stockholm; Chief Medical
Officer at the Forensic Psychiatric Clinic and Chief of the Criminological Institute
at the University of Stockholm. He is author of "Basic Problems of Criminology"
for which he received the Lombroso Prize in 1936. He has published a great number
of books on psychiatry, psychology, philosophy and sociology. Among them is a
monograph on "The Incest Problem in Sweden," written in collaboration with
G. Inghe and Svend Riemer.
Dr. Kinberg has published four articles in this JouRNAL: Obligatory Psychiatric

Examination of Certain Classes of Accused Persons, Vol II, 858 if; Alcohol and
Criminality, Vol. V, 569 f; Criminal Policy in Sweden during the last Ffty Years,
Vol. XXIV, 313 f; On So-Called Fagrancy: A Medico-Soolological Study, Vol.
XXIV, 409 f. _
The present paper was read at the International Congress on Mental Health in
London-RIrop.

Ancient Greek and Roman physicians knew that mental disease was caused by pathological changes in the body. It had
nothing to do with sin or moral guilt but only with natural
biological causes. In conformity with this view, crimes committed by mentally diseased persons should not be punished.
There is a letter from Marcus Aurelius to one of his proconsuls
regarding a man who had murdered his mother in which he
exhorts the proconsul to examine the delinquent carefully in
order to know whether he is really insane or malingering. If
the man is insane he should be spared punishment, "his state
being sufficient punishment."
With the collapse of ancient civilization the biological outlook
on mental diseases vanished and was replaced by the magic viewof primitive cultures. Dark superstitions invaded the minds of
men. The mentally diseased were mostly considered to be possessed by tihe devil or other evil spirits.
In other cases the malady was regarded as a just retribution
for sins. .Anyhow the mentally diseased were branded with evil.
Accordingly their treatment was hard and cruel.
The theological view followed according to which mental illness was a just retribution for sins. Insane criminals had incurred a "moral guilt" and they had to pay for it by more or
less heavy punishment according to the kind of crime. "Moral
guilt" implied "free will," or freedom to choose this or that
form of behavior. But empirical psychology cannot discover
will. It finds only single, changing volitions as parts of the
stream of total biopsychological events that occur in the minds
of men. Free will is thus a baseless concept as a ground for
punishment.
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Various attempts have been made, nevertheless, to find a criterion or test of freedom. Thus, until a few years ago, the
Swedish law declared that a man who did not have the "full use
of his understanding" was not liable to punishment. The
McNaghten case in England-1843-found a crucial test in the
accused's ability to distinguish "right from wrong with respect
to the acts with which he is charged." Psychiatric experience
has taught us that such ignorance of moral values does not
obtain except in some cases of profound mental disease or in
high degrees of feeblemindedness.
The tests of "irresistible impulse," or of "lacking power to
control" one's actions have also played an important part in the
discussion of insane and feebleminded criminals. This is a mere
play upon words because there are no psychological facts to
support such tests. Men's reactions are the output of all the
biopsychological forces that obtain in the organism at the moment of an action. Power to select and control action in the
classic sense is a case of "a little man in man" which is a
reintroduction of magic into psychology. Whenever sufficient
individual and environmental conditions are present an act
comes into existence and talk of "resistible" and irresistible" is void of meaning.
There have been attempts at giving a new content to the term
"irresistible." These attempts came from different quarters,
from conspicuous medical men-Forel, Kraepelin, etc.-and
from jurists-v. Liszt, Alimena, Torp-but they were all failures. Some *of them lead to absurd practical consequences;
others are logically untenable. So, even this effort to save the
concept of "imputability" was a failure.
But if there are no reliable tests of "imputability" and no
means of giving a new and practical content to that concept,
how is it possible to satisfy the pretended need for the Penal
Laws to make a distinction between "imputable" and "not imputable," mentally diseased or abnormal offenders ? The answer
is that it is not possible. If there are still lawyers who believe
in such a distinction, it is a belief without empirical foundation. When lawyers make great intellectual efforts to find such
distinctive traits as could justify this keeping sheep and goats
apart it is lost labor.
On the other hand it is not lost labor to purify Forensic
Psychiatry and criminal policy from all elements belonging'to
theological and metaphysical ways of thinking which we have
inherited from generations living under quite other conditions
and lacking the knowledge of man and society furnished by

1950]

FOBENSIG PSYCHIATrY

modern science. Instead of using our time and our forces in
trying to solve metaphysical sham problems we should strive to
put the correct questions belonging to the empirical and practical field where we are working.
Courts Should Know the Accused
The goal of criminal policy is to prevent crime. In order to
reach that goal one must know as much as is humanly possible
of man as a biopsychologically reacting organism. This knowledge must be at the disposal of the social agents concerned with
the prevention and treatment of crime. Up to now, the courts
*of justice have been considered the principal agents of this kind.
Whether this view is correct need not be discussed here.
Anyhow, as to the activity of the courts there is one postulate
that is of paramount importance: The court should always
know on whom it passes sentence.
This requirement may seem a truism. Nevertheless it is satisfied only to a small extent. For, barring the serious crimes
which attract general attention-murder, grave sexual offenses,
arson, etc.-the court's knowledge of the accused person is very
sparse and often limited to the little interesting circumstances
regarding the crime-objects stolen, sums embezzled, number of
petty frauds, etc.-furnished by the police records.
Sentencing a man may be and often is decisive as to his fate.
*Therefore it seems to be a fair demand on society that its
organs, the courts of justice, should not use their enormous
power on the citizens lightheartedly, but be fully aware of the
consequences of their decisions. If there were a "Charter of
Natural Rights" this postulate should certainly be one of its
items. Anyhow, in the uneven game between society with its
enormous resources and an offender who is often quite alone
and without the material and moral support of other people
it seems reasonable to ask that he be given a fair chance of
not being treated with greater harshness than is necessary to
protect the legal rights of lawful citizens.
According to my view this thesis is the first postulate in the
field of criminal policy.
The courts are not themselves able to procure all the necessary information on accused persons, since their technique in
handling criminal cases prevents them from coming into the
close contact with the accused and his surroundings which is
needed for getting full information. Therefore, the court must
resort to adequate agents. These are probation officers, social
workers, psychologists and the forensic psychiatrists of whom
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the latter by their medical and psychiatric training are best
fitted to provide a many-sided and comprehensive information.
The important auxiliary task of the forensic psychiatrist in
criminal policy has been strongly emphasized by our continuously increasing knowledge of the great frequency of mental
disorders and feeblemindedness among delinquents. In countries
where the mental examination of accused persons has reached
a high development it has taken on a distinctly medico-sociological character with great stress on data belonging to the sociopsychological field. In the same countries mental examination
has also become a regular part of the trial in a great number
of criminal cases.
Responsibility of Forensic Psychiatry
Forensic psychiatry is not-as some people seem to thinka kind of hybrid between medicine and jurisprudence. Such a
hybrid is a logical impossibility, since jurisprudence is concerned with rules of behavior whereas medicine is concerned
with natural facts and the connections between events in the
natural world. Therefore, forensic psychiatry is an empirical'
science whose objects are mental states in people in juridical
situations where their mental conditions are considered of importance to legal decisions. As theological and metaphysical
questions lie outside the field of competence of the forensic
psychiatrist he has no obligation to answer questions of such a
kind but must strictly keep to his task of giving such empirical
medical psychological, and psychiatric information as may be
at his disposal. Further, in distinguishing between different
mental states he has to use only such traits as belong to his own
science, excluding all characteristics derived from juridical,
i.e. conventional, thought. So, for instance, if asked questions
concerning "imputability" or "moral" and "criminal responsibility" he has to declare himself incompetent to answer such
questions which do not belong to his field of knowledge.
On the contrary forensic psychiatry in criminal cases has
several empirical and highly important tasks to fulfill. With
all technical means of investigation it has to inquire whether the
accused person suffers from mental disorders or deficiencies of
any kind, including all traces of traumatic brain injuries and
other brain lesions of encephalitic, allergic or other kinds. It
has to describe such symptoms as may be found and diagnoge,
if possible, the nature of the pathological condition. It should
try to make clear the characterological traits of the accused and
his personal make up of what I call "constitutional radicals."
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Further, it has to analyze the criminal behaviour of the accused
from the viewpoint of criminal psychology, with special regard
to the influence of pathological factors on his behaviour and of
dangerous environmental situations in which he may have lived.
This etiological analysis of the crime is of special value in order
to determine the degree and kind of dangerousness in the
accused. Then, the possible medical psychological and social
treatment must be discussed, as well as the probable reactions
of the accused to different measures of criminal policy. Finally,
forensic psychiatry has to indicate the medical and social prognosis of the case.
There are several other reasons than the above mentioned why
the court should try to know as much as possible about the individual and environmental conditions of accused persons.
During the last decades the measures of criminal policy
have become more and more differentiated. In Sweden, besides
punishment in the legal sense-fines, or different forms of imprisonment-there are eight different kinds of measures of
security to be employed with regard to delinquents: conditional
suspense from prosecution; suspended conviction; conditional
sentence; treatment in reformatories for young offenders; confinement in an. establishment of security for certain abnormal
and dangerous criminals; internment in an establishment of
security for certain dangerous recidivists; internment in an
asylum for delinquents declared exempt from punishment by
reason of mental disease, feeblemindedness or other mental disorders; internment in an establishment for alcoholics or delinquents declared exempt from punishment because of mental disease, feeblemindedness or other mental disorders not needing
treatment in an asylum but needing treatment in an establishment
inebriates.
Forfor
the application of these different treatments the
penal
law states different formal and psychological prerequisites. In
order to recognize some of these the court must resort to a
mental examination.
There is still another important reason why the court must
collaborate with the forensic psychiatrist to get the fullest possible information on the accused. As the court has to choose
between so many different kinds of treatment of the offender it
must know very well why it makes its choice. To ascertain the
right choice the court must be able to anticipate the probable
effect on the offender of the different ways of treatment at disposal in each case. If this knowledge is not to be sheer guesswork the court must be assisted by the forensic psychiatrist who
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has much better means of knowing the offender's probable reactions on different measures of treatment after having studied
his individual structure and the way he has reacted to earlier
social and psychological stimuli.
All these circumstances have resulted in a very heavy increase of the number of mental examinations in Sweden. At
the beginning of this century their number was about 60 a year.
In 1927 the number was 207 and in the last years about 1500
which means a twenty-five fold increase of the number of mental
examinations in about 40 years and implies that about every
fifth person accused of a serious crime is mentally examined.
The great number of examinations shows also that the courts
of justice themselves are conscious of the need of fuller information on the accused persons whom they have to try.
Crimes Are Not always Followed by Punishment
In a kind of opposition to the above thesis that the court
should know whom it is sentencing there is a sham postulate of
penal law that every criminal offense should be followed by a
punishment. The origin of this strange and unrealistic postulate
may be omitted here. But perhaps it should be remembered
that it does not exist either in primitive society or in Roman
law.
In the real world this theoretical postulate has never been
and can never be realized. It presupposes that all crimes are
known, every criminal apprehended and every apprehended
criminal sentenced. It is very questionable, too, whether it is
desirable that every criminal offense should be known and
punished. If it were possible it might throw a light on human
frailty that would be most depressing and, perhaps, most dangerous to the general morality.
Besides, the penal law itself contains a number of exceptions
from this sham-postulate. Such for instance are the conditional
abstention from prosecution, the conditional conviction, the
internment of young offenders in a reformatory, of insane
and feebleminded in an asylum, of inebriates in an establishment for alcoholics, of certain abnormal delinquents and of
certain habitual criminals in an establishment of security.
All these forms of treatment are, at least in Sweden, considered
as measures of security and not punishments and therefore imply an exception from the rule that crimes should be punished.
Thus, the penal law itself has undermined this postulate by
its own regulations.
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The principal reason for the attitude of the criminal policy
of our time that crimes should not regularly be followed by
punishment is the growing insight that punishment as it is
organized in most countries is not an indifferent way of treating
human beings but a dangerous and not seldom a destructive one.
It is not necesary to enumerate all the damaging physiological,
psychological and moral effects of punishment. It may be
sufficient to name one of them. The essential trait of punishment
is to inflict suffering. But such suffering is more likely to elicit
a defiant and vindictive attitude in the sufferer than positive
moral and educative effects. Moreover, in conformity to this
characteristic of punishment it is retrospective in principle
whereas the measures of a constructive criminal policy ought
to be always and decidedly forward-looking.
Parallel with the differentiating development of the practical
measures of criminal policy in Sweden, there has been a successive emancipation of the ways of thinking on matters of forensic
psychiatry and criminal policy from theological and metaphysical terms and concepts. The term "imputability'! that was
used in the law on retaining of certain abnormal and dangerous'
criminals in establishments of security disappeared on the last
revision of this law. Likewise, in the different bills regarding
treatment of different kinds of mentally disordered or feebleminded offenders elaborated during the last fifteen years all
tests of imputability have disappeared. The last bill on exemption from punishment by reason of mental disorders of different
kinds prepared by the Department of Justice in 1945 also lacked
such tests. It reads:
A criminal.action committed by somebody who is mentally diseased
or defective or whose mental state differs to such extent from the normal
that he ought to be submitted to a special treatment shall be exempt
from punishment. If somebody commits a criminal action in a state of
temporary mental confusion he may not be sentenced to punishment.
By the influence of the Council of Law this very radical
text was changed in a conservative direction. In its new form
laid before the Riksdag and adopted by it, it reads as follows:
Nobody may be declared liable for an act committed under the influence of insanity, feeblemindedness or other mental abnormality of
such a serious nature as to be equivalent to insanity. If somebody has
without his own fault accidentally come into such a state that he has lost
the use of his senses, he may not be sentenced to punishment for an
action committed in that state.
It is possible that this reading, too, may sound very radical
in countries where theological and metaphysical ways of thinking still have a great influence on the legal stipulations as to
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these questions. To Swedish ears it sounds unsatisfactory. In
forensic psychiatric quarters in Sweden there is a marked
discontent with this text, especially as regards the words
"eqivalent to insanity" which are considered obscure or meaningless. In juridical quarters, too, this text has begun to be
regarded as unsatisfactory and needing to be revised.
At the same time a new paragraph was adopted by the
Riksdag. It reads:
In certain cases, when somebody who has committed a crime deviates
from the normal as regards his mental state he may be retained in an
establishment of security instead of being punished. Stipulations are
given in a special law.
Obviously, even in this paragraph the psychopathological prerequisite for the application of the law-which implies that
the delinquents are exempt from punishment-is given in
rather vague psychological terms. The purpose of this formulation is that it should not hamper, through strict legal definitions
of states of mental disorder, the efforts of the courts of justice
to choose the most adequate treatment.
Effect of Divergent Opinions of Menta Illness
One of the most, perhaps the most serious obstacle to a
rational and adequate treatment of delinquents is the divergent
opinions in matters of mental disorders, held by laymen and
forensic psychiatrists. In old times, before the rise of psychiatry
to a scientific level, the expressions used to designate people
with mental disorders, "lunatics," "insane," "mad" and so on
had about the same meaning to laymen and doctors. If somebody was "mad" according to the view of doctors the laymen
were of the same opinion. Cases of exemption from punishment because of insanity were extremely rare and the question
whether a criminal should be submitted to punishment was
considered easy to answer.
Since the symptoms and causes of mental disorders have been
better known to the psychiatrists this uniformity of opinion has
disappeared. In conformity to the general medical principle
that sick people should be submitted to medical treatment, the
psychiatrists have contended that mentally diseased delinquents
should not be punished but taken care of in other ways. During
the whole nineteenth century there was a rather fierce struggle
going on about the bodies and souls of insane delinquents between doctors, on the one hand, and prosecutors, judges, and
other lawyers, on the other. The steadily increased knowledge
on mental disorders has been continuously spread to laymen
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but the gap still exists between mental disorder according to
their views and to that of the psychiatrists.
The increased knowledge of the symptoms and nature of
mental disease and the new refined methods of examination
have brought about several important results. The frequency
of brain diseases with mental symptoms is much greater than
was believed earlier. This holds good especially of slight
lesions of encephalitic or allergic origin and of the light epileptic
lesions in persons who do not show seizures-ixophrenes. Persons affected by such lesions do not make the impression of
being insane. On the contrary they may appear to be quite
sound in mind and body but incidentally they may present
symptoms of weakness, tiredness, dizziness and*so on during
which their capacity of work, their attentiveness, their preparedness to fulfil the tasks of life are lessened. In certain social
situations new cravings put upon them may lead to maladjustment.
Further, the so-called borderline cases--which are in fact no
borderline cases but special kinds of mental disorders-have
attracted particular attention. These cases are nowadays called'
"psychopaths," which is however a very unsuccessful denomination since it puts a great number of very different psychopathological conditions under one single head. Now these
"psychopaths" often display a more or less social behavior and
their mental disorders may appear essentially as a lack of moral
sense. This favours a moralizing outlook on these cases which
is an obstacle to an objective and realistic view on their treatment. So they are often considered just wicked people and
most folk forget to ask the reasons of their wickedness. Often
the lack of moral sense is considered as something inherent in
their natural make up and they are regarded as outcasts for
whom one has no other feelings than moral reprobation.
But to the scientific mind it does not matter whether a lack of
moral sense and behavior disorders depend on a misdevelopment
or on lesions of a brain that was healthy until it was attacked
by illness, since nobody has the power to choose the condition
of his brain. During the nineteenth century the dissensions
between psychiatrists and lawyers generally concerned insane criminals with delusions and hallucinations but who
were lucid, logical, and of co-ordinated conduct. Now they bear
on the light forms of cerebral lesions or misdevelopments without feeblemindedness. From a forensic psychiatric point of
view the most important fact as to these cases is that the seemingly light medical symptoms may bring about as serious mal-
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adjustments as the classical forms of insanity, the schizophrenic,
manic-depressive, alcoholic psychosis and so on. Thus, as a
factor of maladjustment and delinquency it may be equivalent
to the classical forms of mental disease since it may imply the
same handicaps for people to adapt their behavior to the moral
standards obtaining at the time and place where they live.
The divergency of opinion concerning what are mental disorders and mental health, and the fact that insane delinquents,
for instance, are exempt from punishment, implies that laymen
-not only the newspaper readers and the audience at trials but
also the prosecutors, the judges and the jurors-find it hard to
grasp that delinquents who seem to them either ordinary people
or extremely ugly customers are mentally diseased or abnormal
people, as is maintained by the forensic psychiatrists. There
has also been more or less vehement reactions against the conclusion of the experts that such people should be exempt from
punishment, especially when they belong to the rather frequent
category where the abnormality seems to manifest itself above
all in a more or less complete absence of moral sense, so-called
"c'moral insanity."
Scientific research on mental disease and abnormality is, however, making its way without worrying about more or less incidental and artificial lay opinions. But the administration of
justice in criminal cases is not an esoteric activity that can be
regulated by the opinion of a small group of scientists. Therefore, it is inevitable that some kind of practical compromise
between scientific and lay. opinions should be reached.
This could be effected only in one of two ways: either considering the treatment of mentally diseased persons as a punishment or abolishing the concept of punishment.
Against the first alternative very serious objections of a
humane and practical nature could be raised. From time immemorial "lunacy" and "madness" have excluded punishment.
If now medical treatment of the insane were to be considered a
punishment this would undoubtedly be regarded as a relapse
into barbarism.
To solve this dilemma there is nothing left but to abolish the
concept of punishment itself.
This would not mean that all citizens should be considered
"irresponsible." On the contrary, it would imply that all human
beings living in the community would be considered socially
responsible for such acts as have a social importance irrespective of their mental condition. The strange division of human
beings in "responsible" and "irresponsible" would disappear.
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But the response of society to human actions would vary
according to the medical, psychological and social conditions
of the individuals.
Neither would this view on the relation between individuals
and society diminish the protection of the law-abiding citizens
against criminal attacks. For, undoubtedly the more society
applies adequate measures for discovering and treating such
individuals as are on the way to delinquency and tries to make
offenders socially adjusted by means of medical treatment and
reeducative measures the more will the real volume of crime
decrease.
Treatment of Delinquents
The opinion on the methods of treating delinquency which
I have intimated above and which has slowly but steadily
made its way in. Sweden during the last three or four decades
can be summarized as follows.
The frequency of mental disorders as factors of delinquency
is much greater than was believed earlier. In fact, mental
disorders and deficiencies play perhaps the greatest part in.
producing crimes, at least in the social conditions obtaining
in Sweden. It is perhaps questionable whether they are equally
important in dountries where the assimilation of the elements
of the population to one rather homogenous stock has not been
achieved. Where racial and other divergencies between members
of the community counteract the solidarity of the individuals
with the whole, and where the social development is still in an
unstable wavering and seething condition.
On account of the predominance of mental disorder in producing crime it is highly probable that the deterrent or moralbuilding action of the penal law is very much overestimated.
Anyhow, the importance of this pretended action is not supported by evidence. In all cases where a man has committed
a crime this action of penal law has been insufficient. Of the
cases where penal law may have prevented people from conimitting crimes we know nothing. When particular individuals
allege personal experience in support of this thesis it may be
objected that human character being empirical its real nature
is disclosed only by action or by abstaining from action. But
it is a ticklish thing to know the causes behind an abstension
from action.
There is another form of general prevention, however, which
consists in efforts to discover such individuals as are menaced
by a criminal development on account of brain-lesions, misdevelopment of the brain or unhappy environmental conditions
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and to submit them to an adequate treatment. This kind of
measure is preeminently important to the prevention of crime.
Increased knowledge of the causes of crime, too, has taught us
that purely medical treatment of criminals, as well as psychotherapy and an adaptive choice of social conditions are often
much more effective preventive measures than the existence of
penal laws and its administration.
Protective Law
Starting from these and other facts several practical conclusions as to the ways of organizing criminal policy have been
made in Sweden.
First the dogma of the necessity of punishment must be abolished. In Sweden we hope to approach the time when we may
be able to drop even the concept of punishment. Instead of
penal law we are trying to prepare a protective law where the
concept "protection" is taken in its double sense of protecting
law-abiding citizens from attacks by dangerous people and protecting people with unsound brains or unfavorable surroundings from becoming delinquents. Since mental disorders and
deficiencies are so often dominant causes of crime the first thing
to do when a man has committed a crime is to take into consideration whether there may not be some mental disorders at
the bottom of his behavior. He may suffer from a classical
insanity, from encephalitic allergic or ixophrenic lesions, he
may have had some head injury, he may be an alcoholic or other
drug addict and so on. The court has to decide what treatment
should be applied taking into consideration the statutory means
of treatment in relation to the clinical psychological, and social
findings brought to light by the mental examination. Instead of
taking for granted that the accused person should be punished
-which has up to now been the rule--the court should in the
first place take into consideration whether any treatment at all
is necessary for the protection of the individual himself or of
society and if so whether he needs a special treatment of some
kind-antidrug-or other medical treatment, psychotherapy,
retaining or interning in an establishment of security, placing
in a reformatory, etc. If so, the court should decide that he
should be committed to the charge of the competent authority.
Not until the court has found neither of these special treatments to be applicable should it decide that the accused should
be put for a fixed time in an establishment corresponding to
our prisons but where all regulations tending to produce suffering for its own sake should be abolished.
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In my view the time seems already to be ripe for the abolition of the primitive, mediaeval and barbarous idea that punishment is the specific remedy for crime. It is also time to
remove from the administration of justice the puerile methods
of letting the judge look up in the Penal Code how many months
or years of imprisonment is the proper treatment for the unlawful action of the prosecuted.
Instead the Court of Justice as an agent of criminal policy
ought to put before itself the following questions:
"What kind of man is the delinquent?"
"What individual and environmental factors have made him
commit just now the crime that he is prosecuted for."
"Is it necessary for the common welfare or for his own to
react to his crime with any measure of criminal policy?"
Not until the judge has had these questions answered as correctly and fully as possible he should put the fourth and last
question:
"What measures ought to be taken to prevent the delinquent
from committing new crimes of the same or other kinds?"
A visible result of the opinion that it is not necessary for the
common welfare or for the delinquent's to react to every crime
with punishment or any other measure of criminal policy is the
Swedish Law on Abstention from Indictment of 1944. In this
law it is stipulated that such abstention may take place if the
delinquent is less than eighteen years old, if he has been taken
care of for protective education or other equivalent measure
and it is probable that he will abstain from further delinquency
or if the offense is slight and has been caused by mischief or
precipitancy.
During the preparatory work on a revision of Penal Law it
has also been discussed whether the age at which persons begin
to be punishable should not be raised from 15 to 18 years. As
everybody knows puberty implies as a rule a certain lack of
mental balance connected with the profound changes going on
in the organism. Nobody is mentally mature before eighteen
years and most people not until several years later. Therefore,
it is not fair to treat young and unmature persons as if they
were grown ups with equal experience of the world and equal
possibility of judging their situations and finding the rational
adjustments to them.
This anti-metaphysical trend of Swedish thought can be traced
in our attitude toward capital punishment.
The death penalty was not abolished in Sweden until 1921.
But already since the third decade of the 19th century there
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has been in Sweden a critical attitude towards the death penalty. In the 1862-63 Riksdag the Estate of Peasantry resolved
that the death penalty should not be included in the new Penal
Law-introduced in 1864-and in the Riksdag 1865-66 the same
Estate unanimously passed a Bill ordering the suspension of
the death penalty for ten years. The remaining Estates-the
Nobility, the Clergy and the Burghers-rejected the Bill. In
1867, the abolition of the death penalty was moved in the Diet.
The Bill was passed by the Second Chamber " but rejected by
one single vote in the First. Thus it was only because of one
man's opinion that capital punishment was not abolished in
Sweden already in 1867.
Since 1865 sentences of death have been carried out in Sweden
only in 15 cases, since 1900 only in two cases. Thus, the importance of the death penalty as a practical measure of criminal
policy has been very slight.
In spite of the increasingly rare use of the death penalty
serious crimes against persons have decreased considerably.
From 1845-55 the average number of murders and attempted
murders was 16 per million of the population annually. This.
average dropped in 1922 and 1923 after the abolition of capital
punishment to 1,36. From 1922 to 1927 only 0,47 per million
were condemned for murder.
To believers in the death penalty it might seem natural that
our prisons should contain a great number of persons convicted
to penal servitude for life. Now the actual number of such persons in Swedish prisons is four. This does not mean that our
courts of justice after the trial let loose persons having committed murder. But in a great percentage of the cases it is
recognized that the murderer is insane and therefore he is declared exempt from punishment and placed in an asylum. This
holds good of all "family-murderers" of most "fianc6e-killers"
and of a lot of other types of murderers.
In several cases, though, the murderers are punished with
penal servitude for life. This does not mean that the persons
having incurred this punishment are kept in prison for the rest
of their lives. On the contrary, they are conditionally released
or pardoned after about ten years and restored to liberty. As
murderers very seldom become recidivists they return to a more
or less normal and useful life in society. This holds good, too, for
persons who have been declared exempt from punishment by
reason of mental disorders. When they have regained their
1 In 1866 there was a reform of the Constitution abolishing the Estates and replac-

ing them by two Chambers.
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mental health, which is not rare for instance among persons
who have become family murderers under the influence of a
depressive condition with religious delusions urging them to
kill their children in order to spare them the theological consequences of sin, they are discharged from the asylum and go
back to their ordinary occupations.
Finally, there has been in Sweden a growing insight that
chronic alcoholism with pronounced medical symptoms is generally a state secondary to brain diseases, often light encephalitic or allergic disturbances. In conformity to this opinion
alcoholic delinquents are often declared exempt from punishment and committed to establishments for the treatment of
inebriates according to a special stipulation in the Law of Treatment of Inebriates. This attitude, too, contributes to decrease
the number of persons condemned to punishment and thus to
invalidate the sham postulate of penal law that all criminals
should be punished. The number of prisoners in Swedish prisons
also for the present time is only between 1900 and 2000.
In conclusion, I do not wish to give the impression that
forensic psychiatry and criminal policy have reached an ideal
level in Sweden. Everybody knows that when one lives in a
country and has much to do with a special kind of its social
institutions and tlheir functioning one is more inclined to see
their deficiencies than their advantages. That is our case too.
We are fully conscious of the fact that the level of legislation is
much higher than that of its practical application. This is quite
natural, for it is much easier to make good laws than to make
them function well, as good functioning presupposes an adequate
staff. But such staff requires rational selection, long training,
and tradition. As yet we have not had enough time to achieve
this. On the contrary, for the time being we are badly lacking
adequate medical staff for this work, doctors with sufficient
training and possessing the many-sided knowledge necessary
to cover the great field of forensic psychiatry and criminology
being rather scarce.
But if we are permitted to lead our own life in the future as
an independent nation and if the economic and financial situation
of the country will improve we hope to do better work.

